The probability of a direct, large-scale conventional assault by Russia on NATO is assessed as low. Russian conventional forces remain heavily committed in Ukraine and have suffered significant personnel and equipment losses, making them likely unprepared for a full-scale conflict with the Alliance's combined strength. Moscow's military planning appears focused on sustaining operations in Ukraine and rebuilding degraded capabilities rather than opening a new front against significantly stronger opponents.

The risk of continued and potentially escalating hybrid warfare activities remains high, as these operations constitute Russia's primary mode of confrontation with the West below the threshold of Article 5. These activities include sophisticated cyber operations targeting critical infrastructure, disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining democratic processes, economic coercion through energy supplies, and covert operations designed to create political instability within NATO member states. We assess that these operations will intensify as Moscow seeks asymmetric advantages.

The risk of a conventional attack could increase, contingent upon factors such as the success of Russian military reconstitution, the outcome of the war in Ukraine, NATO's sustained defense enhancements, and the broader geopolitical landscape. A Russian victory in Ukraine, perceived NATO disunity, or successful military modernization could embolden Moscow to consider more aggressive actions. Conversely, significant NATO reinforcement of its eastern flank, continued alliance cohesion, and Russian military setbacks would likely maintain deterrence effectiveness.

The most significant near-term risk stems not from a premeditated large-scale invasion, but from a miscalculation during an intensified hybrid campaign or a limited probe designed to test NATO's resolve. Historical precedent suggests that Putin may miscalculate Western responses to limited operations, as occurred in Ukraine. The danger of unintended escalation is particularly acute in regions with complex ethnic compositions and historical ties to Russia, such as the Baltic states. Such scenarios could rapidly escalate beyond original intentions if NATO's response differs from Russian expectations.

By April 2024, Russian land forces were estimated to be 15% larger than they were in February 2022, prior to the full-scale invasion. Plans are in place to increase the size of the active-duty military to 1.5 million personnel, supported by significant financial incentives for new recruits. Contract soldiers now receive starting salaries of approximately 204,000 rubles ($2,400) per month—more than three times the average Russian salary—plus substantial combat bonuses and benefits for families.

A substantial 40% of the 2025 federal budget is reportedly allocated to military and security services. The Russian defense industry has been placed on a war footing, with many enterprises operating round-the-clock. This represents the highest proportion of GDP dedicated to defense since the Soviet era, with estimates suggesting military expenditures now exceed 6% of Russia's GDP, compared to the 3-4% range prior to 2022.

Some intelligence assessments and analysts suggest that these efforts could enable Russia to pose a significant conventional military challenge to NATO allies, particularly the Baltic states, as early as 2027. Western military officials have warned that Russia could rebuild sufficient combat power for offensive operations against NATO's eastern flank within 3-5 years, assuming the current pace of reconstitution continues and combat losses in Ukraine stabilize or decrease.

This reconstitution continues to emphasize mass and mobilization, with some analysts suggesting a potential return to a pre-"New Look" military model that relies heavily on conscription and large formations. The Russian General Staff appears to have concluded that large-scale, artillery-heavy operations with substantial personnel reserves better suit Russia's industrial capacity and operational doctrine than the more professional, high-tech force envisioned in earlier reforms.

Despite Western sanctions, Russia has maintained production of key weapons systems, albeit with some technological compromises. Older tank models like T-62s have been refurbished and deployed alongside newly manufactured T-90s. Artillery production has been prioritized, with shell manufacturing reportedly reaching 4.5 million rounds annually by early 2024, supported by imports from North Korea, Iran, and covert supply chains for critical components.

Combat experience in Ukraine has driven significant tactical and operational adaptations. Russian forces have improved electronic warfare capabilities, drone integration, and counter-drone systems. Training regimens now incorporate lessons from Ukraine, with new recruits receiving more realistic preparation for modern battlefield conditions, though quality remains inconsistent across units and training centers.

The war in Ukraine has exposed critical vulnerabilities in transatlantic supply chains, defense production capacity, and procurement strategies. NATO's ammunition production rates lag significantly behind Russia's current output. European defense manufacturers struggle with fragmented markets, regulatory barriers, and insufficient investment in production facilities. The Alliance's ability to sustain a high-intensity conflict beyond several months remains questionable, with estimates suggesting it would take years to replenish stockpiles at current production rates.

The long-standing pledge for Allies to spend 2% of GDP on defense is now widely considered insufficient. NATO Secretary General Rutte has stated it "just doesn't cut it anymore," with discussions underway for a new, considerably higher target, potentially "north of 3%" for direct military expenditure. Only 23 of 32 NATO members currently meet the 2% threshold, and achieving higher spending levels faces significant political hurdles in many member states. The spending gap between European allies and the United States remains substantial, with the U.S. still shouldering a disproportionate share of the Alliance's defense burden.

NATO operates by consensus, particularly for the invocation of Article 5. This model could become a critical vulnerability if a member state, due to political considerations or Russian influence, refuses to agree, potentially paralyzing the Alliance in a crisis. Recent political tensions between member states, including disputes between Turkey and Greece, concerns about democratic backsliding in Hungary and Turkey, and divergent strategic priorities have complicated NATO's decision-making process. The Alliance must balance inclusivity with operational effectiveness while maintaining its core principle of collective defense.

NATO faces challenges related to slow logistics, extended reinforcement timelines, and a reliance on U.S. strategic lift capabilities and critical enablers such as command and control (C2) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Military mobility across Europe is hampered by regulatory obstacles, inadequate infrastructure, and bureaucratic border-crossing procedures. Recent exercises have revealed significant gaps in the Alliance's ability to rapidly deploy and sustain forces on its eastern flank. The NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) established in eastern member states have improved coordination but major capability gaps remain in areas such as strategic airlift, sealift capacity, and pre-positioned equipment.

Sweden contributes a significant defense industrial base, advanced technological capabilities, and strategic depth on the Scandinavian peninsula. Swedish defense companies like Saab provide cutting-edge systems including the Gripen fighter aircraft and advanced radar and missile technologies that strengthen NATO's technological edge.

Sweden alone reportedly possesses 163 naval vessels suitable for Baltic operations, compared to Russia's 43 in the region. Finnish naval capabilities, including mine warfare expertise, complement NATO's existing Baltic maritime forces and create multiple dilemmas for Russian Baltic Fleet operations.

Russian forces previously stationed in the Leningrad Military District may be insufficient to cover this expanded border, potentially drawing resources from other theaters. This creates strategic tradeoffs for Russian military planners already stretched by commitments in Ukraine and elsewhere.

Their accession also strengthens NATO's early warning network, providing improved situational awareness of Russian military movements in the Northern European theater. This enhanced intelligence picture contributes to deterrence by denial, making surprise operations more difficult to execute.

A Russian strike inside Ukraine accidentally kills NATO officials or military personnel present in an advisory or support capacity. Moscow might claim it was unintentional, but the affected NATO member state(s) might not find this credible, leading to political pressure for retaliation. Historical precedents suggest that public outrage would force leaders into a corner, with domestic politics potentially overriding strategic caution. The ambiguity of such incidents—whether they were truly accidental or deliberate provocations—further complicates de-escalation efforts.

Aggressive Russian military maneuvers against U.S. or NATO surveillance aircraft operating in international airspace over the Black Sea or Baltic Sea could result in a shoot-down and the death of NATO personnel, creating immense pressure for a military response. The 2001 Hainan Island incident between the U.S. and China demonstrates how quickly such encounters can escalate. In the current environment of heightened tensions, standard military protocols might be misinterpreted or deliberately ignored, with command structures having limited time to verify information before making critical decisions.

Russia could misperceive NATO's defensive force buildups, large-scale exercises, or political discussions about Ukraine's future security arrangements as direct preparations for intervention in the Ukraine war or an imminent attack on Russia itself. The Kremlin's threat perception is heavily influenced by its own strategic culture and historical experiences, which often differ dramatically from Western perspectives. This perception gap makes confidence-building measures particularly challenging. Russian military doctrine emphasizes pre-emptive action against perceived threats, potentially triggering a dangerous action-reaction cycle based on misinterpretation rather than actual intent.

A "frozen conflict" in Ukraine would carry significant long-term risks of unintentional escalation between Russia and NATO, as unresolved grievances and periodic flare-ups along a volatile line of contact could easily spill over. Such conflicts tend to become laboratories for new weapons systems and proxy warfare techniques, with military incidents occurring with alarming regularity. The ongoing militarization of such zones draws in external actors and creates a complex web of tripwires that could trigger broader confrontation. Evidence from other frozen conflicts in Georgia, Moldova, and elsewhere demonstrates how these situations rarely remain truly "frozen" and instead generate recurring crises that can suddenly flare into larger confrontations.

The current state of NATO-Russia relations is at a historical nadir. Most formal dialogue mechanisms have been suspended, and only essential military-to-military communication channels remain, primarily for deconfliction in specific operational areas (e.g., Syria). The NATO-Russia Council, once a vital forum for security dialogue, has effectively ceased functioning, while diplomatic missions have been dramatically reduced on both sides.

Traditional arms control frameworks are eroding or defunct, removing important guardrails for military activities and capabilities. The collapse of the INF Treaty, suspension of the CFE Treaty, and uncertain future of New START have eliminated crucial verification mechanisms and constraints on nuclear and conventional forces. This erosion creates dangerous uncertainty about force postures and capabilities during crisis situations.

Russia appears to be employing a strategy of "the threat that leaves something to chance," deliberately creating ambiguity to deter NATO actions. This includes vague nuclear doctrine statements, hybrid warfare tactics that blur attribution, and unpredictable military exercises near NATO borders. Such ambiguity complicates NATO response planning and increases the risk of miscalculation during periods of heightened tension.

Significant challenges remain, including the inherent ambiguity in Russian-stated thresholds for escalation and the risk of overconfidence if initial escalatory steps by one side do not provoke an immediate strong response from the other. Russia's nuclear doctrine suggests a lower threshold for nuclear use than Western policies, while its concept of "escalate to de-escalate" introduces dangerous uncertainty about how confrontations might evolve. The integration of conventional, nuclear, and non-military tools in Russian strategy creates additional complexity in predicting escalation pathways.

The information domain has emerged as a critical factor in modern crisis management. Disinformation campaigns, strategic leaks, and manipulated narratives can accelerate escalation dynamics by inflaming public opinion, creating pressure on decision-makers, and distorting perceptions of adversary intentions. The compressed timeframes of the digital information environment leave less time for deliberate decision-making during crises.

North Korea has become a major supplier of artillery shells (reportedly millions of rounds) and ballistic missiles to Russia, significantly aiding Moscow's firepower in Ukraine. Intelligence sources indicate that North Korean 152mm and 122mm artillery shells have been identified on numerous Ukrainian battlefields, particularly in high-intensity sectors. The KN-23 and KN-24 short-range ballistic missiles supplied by Pyongyang have enabled Russia to intensify its strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and military targets.

By late 2024 and early 2025, multiple sources, including NATO intelligence, indicated that North Korea had deployed thousands of troops (estimates range from 10,000 to 12,000) to Russia. Some of these forces were reportedly stationed near the Ukrainian border in regions like Kursk. Satellite imagery and intelligence reports suggest these troops have received accelerated training in Russian combat doctrine and are likely being prepared for frontline deployment. The inclusion of North Korean special operations forces with experience in tunnel warfare and infiltration has been particularly concerning to Western military analysts.

In return for this military assistance, Russia is believed to be providing North Korea with advanced military technology, financial support, and assistance in circumventing international sanctions. This likely includes satellite and missile guidance technology, submarine-related systems, and air defense capabilities that would significantly enhance North Korea's own military posture in Northeast Asia. Economic support may include oil supplies, wheat, and other commodities critical to sustaining the North Korean regime, alongside covert financial channels that undermine the international sanctions regime.

This deepening military cooperation demonstrates the growing interconnectedness of security challenges across the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions and undermines non-proliferation regimes. It effectively creates a "coalition of revisionist powers" seeking to challenge the U.S.-led international order. For NATO, this partnership necessitates a more global approach to security planning. For South Korea, Japan, and other Indo-Pacific allies, the Russia-North Korea cooperation represents a direct threat through potential technology transfers that could accelerate Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs.

The international community has struggled to develop an effective response to this emerging military alliance. Additional sanctions on both countries have shown limited effectiveness given their already isolated economic positions. Military aid to Ukraine has been partially calibrated to counter the specific threats posed by North Korean weapons and personnel, while diplomatic pressure on China to limit its support for both nations has yielded inconsistent results. The UN Security Council remains largely paralyzed due to Russia's veto power.

The risk in this timeframe potentially increases from its current low/low-moderate base. This is contingent upon several evolving factors: the success and pace of Russia's military reconstitution and modernization; the ultimate outcome of the war in Ukraine; NATO's sustained commitment to its own defense enhancements and industrial revitalization; and the broader global geopolitical situation. Intelligence assessments indicate that Russian military planning is already oriented toward a 5-7 year reconstitution timeline, with priority given to precision strike capabilities, integrated air defense, and next-generation electronic warfare systems.

If Russia perceives that NATO's resolve is waning, that its own military capabilities offer a temporary window of advantage before NATO fully re-arms, or that internal Western political dynamics create an opportunity, the risk of conventional aggression could rise significantly. Historical analysis of Russian strategic behavior suggests Putin or his successor may be inclined to exploit temporary advantages rather than wait for perfect conditions. The period following leadership transitions in key Western nations could present a particularly vulnerable moment, especially if accompanied by defense spending controversies or public fatigue regarding European security commitments.

President Putin's decision-making will be influenced by his holistic assessment of the "correlation of forces" - a broader strategic evaluation encompassing political factors, economic considerations, and temporal dynamics. This Soviet-derived concept remains fundamental to Russian strategic thinking and extends beyond pure military calculations to include assessments of social cohesion, economic resilience, and political will on both sides. Recent statements by senior Russian military theorists indicate an evolving doctrine that increasingly emphasizes the psychological dimension of strategic competition and the exploitation of perceived Western societal vulnerabilities.

A protracted stalemate in Ukraine could paradoxically lead Putin to seek a "game-changer" by escalating horizontally against NATO to alter the strategic calculus. Such horizontal escalation might initially target vulnerable points in NATO's eastern flank or involve aggressive operations in the Baltic or Black Sea regions. Intelligence assessments suggest Russian military exercises increasingly rehearse limited operations against NATO territory designed to demonstrate resolve while remaining below the threshold of triggering a full Article 5 response. The greatest danger period may occur if Russia achieves partial objectives in Ukraine but remains unsatisfied with the strategic outcome, potentially driving risk-acceptance behavior to secure a definitive victory or favorable negotiating position.

The combined conventional military power of the 32 NATO allies, significantly augmented by U.S. capabilities, represents an overwhelming force. This includes advanced air defense systems, naval assets, ground forces, and precision strike capabilities deployed across multiple theaters. NATO's enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic states and Poland further reinforces this conventional deterrent posture.

The U.S. nuclear deterrent and NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements provide a credible second-strike capability that ensures mutual vulnerability. The triad of air, land, and sea-based nuclear delivery systems offers flexible response options while demonstrating resolve. Recent modernization efforts across the alliance have reinforced the credibility of this ultimate security guarantee.

The certainty of a collective defense response remains NATO's cornerstone principle. Any attack against one ally is considered an attack against all, triggering a united response with the full spectrum of alliance capabilities. This solidarity has been repeatedly affirmed at recent NATO summits, with clear messaging that there are no "minor incursions" or "limited conflicts" that would not trigger Article 5.

Catastrophic sanctions and economic collapse for Russia would follow any aggression against NATO. The unprecedented sanctions imposed following the Ukraine invasion demonstrate Western resolve, but represent only a fraction of potential economic warfare capabilities. A full-spectrum response would likely include complete disconnection from the global financial system, comprehensive trade embargoes, seizure of sovereign assets, and coordinated action against Russian energy exports.

Unpredictable and uncontrollable risk of nuclear exchange serves as a powerful restraint on Russian strategic calculus. Any conventional conflict with NATO carries inherent escalation risks that could rapidly transition to nuclear use. Both Western and Russian military doctrines acknowledge these dangerous dynamics, creating powerful incentives for conflict avoidance. War gaming exercises consistently demonstrate the difficulty of maintaining escalation control once conventional hostilities begin.

Potential domestic unrest threatening Putin's regime would likely emerge from a prolonged, costly conflict with NATO. The Russian public has largely supported the Ukraine conflict due to effective information control and the limited nature of mobilization. A full-scale war with NATO would require general mobilization, impose severe economic hardships, and potentially fracture elite support for the regime. Historical precedents suggest that failed military adventures often lead to leadership changes in authoritarian systems.

Reinforcing political unity regarding the nature of the Russian threat and the paramount importance of collective defense is essential. NATO must actively counter Russian disinformation campaigns aimed at fracturing Alliance cohesion and undermining public support for robust defense policies. This requires coordinated intelligence sharing, joint strategic messaging, and consistent diplomatic engagement across all member states to ensure a unified front against malign influence operations.

Allies must prepare their populations and economies for a potentially long-term period of confrontation with Russia, requiring sustained defense investment, societal resilience, and strategic patience. This necessitates developing comprehensive national security strategies that balance immediate defense needs with long-term capability development, while also strengthening critical infrastructure protection, energy security, and public resilience against hybrid threats. Educational initiatives to foster public understanding of geopolitical challenges will be crucial for maintaining support during extended periods of tension.

NATO leadership, at both the political and military levels, must consistently and publicly articulate the nature of the Russian threat, the rationale for increased defense efforts, and the benefits of collective security to maintain broad public support across the Alliance. This communication strategy should emphasize NATO's defensive posture, highlight the Alliance's contributions to regional stability, and clearly explain how defense investments translate to enhanced security for citizens. Regular engagement with media, civil society, and educational institutions will help broaden understanding of NATO's mission and counter adversarial narrative campaigns.

Internally, NATO must actively work to manage and resolve political differences between member states on key strategic issues, as these can be exploited by Moscow to weaken Alliance resolve. Establishing more robust consultation mechanisms, enhancing the role of the North Atlantic Council in addressing intra-Alliance disputes, and creating dedicated diplomatic channels for resolving bilateral tensions between member states will strengthen NATO's internal cohesion. The Alliance should also develop a more structured approach to addressing democratic backsliding within member nations, as internal governance challenges can undermine collective decision-making and response capabilities.

The significant expansion of NATO's high-readiness forces to a pool of 500,000 personnel is a powerful signal of intent and capability. This represents a dramatic increase from the previous 40,000-strong NATO Response Force, demonstrating the Alliance's commitment to enhanced conventional deterrence in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

The credibility of this deterrent force depends not just on numbers, but on the actual combat readiness, equipment levels, logistical support, and interoperability of these designated national contributions. Readiness includes not only trained personnel but also pre-positioned equipment, regular multinational exercises, and validated command and control structures that can function effectively under wartime conditions.

Widespread challenges across the transatlantic defence industrial base, including ammunition production shortfalls and concerns about equipment serviceability in some member states, mean that a "paper tiger" force, however numerically large, will not effectively deter an adversary like President Putin. Historical gaps between NATO's declared capabilities and actual operational readiness have been well-documented, with many units suffering from insufficient maintenance, inadequate stocks of spare parts, and limited training opportunities.

His assessment will likely focus on NATO's actual deployable combat power and sustainment capacity, not merely on declared force pools. Russian military planners meticulously analyze NATO exercises, deployment times, and operational constraints to identify vulnerabilities and will be quick to recognize discrepancies between announced force levels and genuine warfighting capabilities. Putin's strategic calculus will be influenced more by demonstrated operational effectiveness than by political declarations of intent.

While NATO's collective airpower is often cited as a decisive advantage, this superiority cannot be taken for granted in the initial phases of a conflict. The alliance's combined air assets vastly outnumber Russia's in quantity and quality, but geographic constraints, forward basing limitations, and the challenges of multinational coordination could significantly delay the full deployment of this theoretical advantage.

Russia is acutely aware of this NATO strength and has historically invested heavily in layered ground-based air defense systems. Furthermore, Russia possesses significant electronic warfare capabilities and long-range precision strike assets that would likely be used to target NATO airbases, command and control nodes, and critical infrastructure early in any conflict. The S-400/S-500 integrated air defense systems, combined with tactical mobile units like the Pantsir and Tor systems, create dense defense zones that would challenge NATO air operations, particularly in the critical early phases of a confrontation.

The objective would be to degrade NATO's air operations, delay the achievement of air superiority, or at least raise the cost of doing so to prohibitive levels. Russian military doctrine emphasizes disrupting the enemy's ability to project power before it can be fully mobilized. By targeting key nodes in NATO's air infrastructure and creating contested zones where air operations become increasingly risky, Russia could potentially fragment NATO's response and create windows of opportunity for ground operations, especially in border regions where rapid reaction is essential.

The initial contest for air dominance would likely be critical, potentially attritional, and could significantly impact the timeline and effectiveness of NATO's support to ground operations. NATO cannot assume immediate or uncontested air supremacy; it would have to be actively fought for and secured. Historical analysis suggests that the first 72-96 hours of air operations would be decisive, with both sides attempting to degrade the other's capabilities through a combination of kinetic strikes, electronic warfare, and cyber operations. The outcome of this initial phase would substantially determine the character and pace of the subsequent conflict.

To counter these challenges, NATO must continue to develop distributed operations concepts, harden key infrastructure, improve passive and active defenses at airbases, and practice rapid redeployment of air assets. Additionally, investment in counter-A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) capabilities, advanced electronic warfare systems, and standoff weapons will be critical to maintaining the alliance's airpower advantage in future conflicts. Exercises must realistically simulate contested air environments rather than assuming the permissive conditions that have characterized recent NATO operations.

The deepening integration of Belarus into Russia's military and strategic planning, particularly under the framework of the Union State and the explicit linkage in Russia's 2024 Nuclear Doctrine, transforms Belarus from merely a compliant neighbor into a potential trigger for wider conflict. This integration has accelerated dramatically since 2020, with Moscow leveraging Lukashenko's political vulnerability to extract significant military concessions, including the establishment of permanent Russian military bases and the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil. The formal provisions of the Union State treaty, which many Western analysts previously dismissed as largely symbolic, are now being operationalized in ways that effectively extend Russia's strategic and military frontier directly to NATO's eastern border.

Any significant instability within Belarus, or even a perceived external threat to the Lukashenko regime (which Moscow could easily fabricate or exaggerate, perhaps alleging NATO interference to foment a "color revolution"), could be used by the Kremlin as a pretext for a large-scale "defensive" military deployment into Belarus. Historical precedent suggests Moscow has both the capability and willingness to manufacture such pretexts when strategically advantageous, as evidenced in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and eastern Ukraine (2014-2022). Internal intelligence assessments indicate Russian information operations already maintain prepared narratives about Western subversion in Belarus that could be rapidly activated to justify intervention. The Kremlin's demonstrated proficiency in reflexive control operations makes this scenario particularly concerning, as it could manipulate NATO into responses that further "justify" Russian escalation.

Such a deployment, conducted under the guise of stabilizing an ally or protecting the Union State, could very rapidly pivot to an offensive posture directed against Poland or Lithuania, catching NATO off-guard and providing Russia with a strategic advantage at the outset of a crisis. The geography of Belarus offers Russia a significant operational advantage, allowing for the potential to cut the Baltic states off from the rest of NATO via the Suwałki Gap - a mere 65-kilometer stretch of Polish-Lithuanian border connecting Kaliningrad with Belarus. Military assessments suggest that Russian forces could conduct this maneuver within 24-72 hours of entering Belarus in force, presenting NATO with a fait accompli before an effective defensive posture could be established. The regular joint Russia-Belarus "Zapad" exercises have repeatedly rehearsed precisely these types of operations, suggesting they feature prominently in Russian operational planning.

The "threat to the Union State" could thus become a convenient casus belli for aggressive Russian action originating from Belarusian territory. This approach offers Moscow substantial strategic advantages: it creates ambiguity about Russia's ultimate intentions until forces are already positioned for offensive operations; it allows Russia to claim it is merely honoring treaty obligations rather than initiating aggression; and it potentially divides NATO politically by focusing the immediate threat on just a few member states. Furthermore, it could create significant challenges for NATO's Article 5 consensus if Russian forces technically remain on Belarusian territory while projecting power against neighboring states through long-range fires, electronic warfare, or air defense bubble extension. This scenario represents a particularly dangerous potential pathway to conflict that exploits gaps in NATO's current readiness posture along its northeastern flank.